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months later when the broker had not yet sold the property, this mort-
gagor, under threat of foreclosure, reconveyed to the mortgagee. This
was held to constitute a sale within contemplation of the parties, and the
mortgagor-seller had to pay a commission though he had received no con-
sideration for his irrevocable offer. Suffice to say, the equities are not al-
ways with the broker. A resurgence of the doctrine of consideration to
render a promise binding might better "effectuate justice between the
parties."
The basic fallacy in this area is the supposition that the owner bargained
for the broker's efforts, or that these efforts constitute an acceptance of
the owner's offer. It is submitted that this is contrary to the agreement,
and to the owner's promise, which would reward only success, regardless
of verbiage about "services." "The acceptance of a unilateral contract
must be by all the acts contemplated by the offer."59
59 Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308, 310 (1950).
MATTER OF TOTTEN-AN ANOMALY IN
THE LAW OF TRUSTS
The term Totten Trust' is a familiar one.2 A comprehension of the
meaning of the term exists in the minds of the majority of lawyers to
varying degrees. Yet, the very danger of the Totten Trust lies in this
vague familiarity which leads to various misconceptions.
Many lawyers feel that the Totten Trust is the law throughout the
land, and that it is certainly the law in their particular jurisdiction, though
the question may never have been litigated. There are those who accept
it as a valid trust without question, completely overlooking its transgres-
sion of many of the settled concepts of trust law. Oftentimes, bank ac-
counts for more than a single person are indiscriminately labeled as
Totten Trusts.3
The purpose of this discussion is to dispel the misunderstandings and
doubts concerning the Totten Trust. The analysis of this anomaly 4 in the
' Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
2 The Totten Trust is often referred to as a "tentative trust" also.
3 See footnote 30 for a treatment of the problem.
4 In 1905 the case Matter of Totten was thought to be judicial legislation. For example,
one author said:
"This decision has been widely commented upon by legal journals and, so far as the
writer is aware, has been unanimously disapproved. It is inconsistent with earlier au-
thorities in the State of New York. It introduces a serious anomaly into the law of
trusts; indeed, a trust that is revocable at the will of the creator can hardly be said to be
a trust at all. It impugns the policy of the statute of wills, by permitting a disposition of
property to take effect only after death, without following the testamentary require-
ments. On the other hand, as a piece of constructive legislation the decision could hard-
ly be too highly praised. It effectuates a custom which has grown up among the hum-
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history and law of trusts will involve a complete coverage of the area, in-
cluding an analysis of states adhering to the doctrine, states which have re-
jected it, and states which, have never considered it.
BACKGROUND TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS
I. HISTORY
Uses and Trusts were introduced into England shortly after the Nor-
man conquest." Maitland suggests that the first general employment of
trusts would be as uses in the thirteenth century when lands were con-
veyed to be held to the use of the Franciscan Friars, who by the laws of
their order were not allowed individually or as a community to own
property.6 By the fifteenth century, the custom of conveying land to
uses had become so common that during the reign of Henry V (1413-
1422), it has been said, that the greater part of land in England was held in
use.7 By this method, tenants could avoid the exactions of their lord, for-
feitures and dower could be avoided, creditors could not reach the cestui
que, and religious corporations could hold land in spite of the mortmain
acts.8 At first, these trusts or uses were purely honorary and not enforce-
able in any court of law because of the rigidity of early English law.
bier classes of people who, in placing their money on deposit in trust for other persons,
often intend to retain the right to use it, principal as well as interest, during life, but that
whatever remains at the time of death shall go the cestuis que trust. Under the law as it
stood the estates of depositors, who as trustees had drawn money from accounts, would
be liable to refund the same to the cestuis que trust. The validation of the business cus-
tom in question seems so unobjectionable, indeed so desirable, that the writer has on
various occasions advocated the enactment of a statute on just the lines laid down in the
Matter of Totten. He did not believe that a court would venture upon such a radical
innovation and it is difficult to justify it as an exercise of judicial power." 14 Yale Law
Journal 312, 315 (1905).
5 There has been some conflict among the authorities as to the derivation of the trust.
Some scholars believed that the trust evolved from the Roman fidei-commissum. Story
Eq. Juris. S§ 966, 967 (1918). Pomeroy, Eq. Juris § 976-978 (1918).
More recently however the authorities have agreed that the trust evolved from the
German treuhand or Salmon. Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L. Quart. Rev. 162
(1885); Ames, Origin of Uses & Trusts, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History, 739, 740 (1893); Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 136
(1894). It also has been suggested that the Wakf or WVaqf which is the equivalent
under Moslem law of a charitable trust, gave rise to the English use or trust. Khadduri &
Liebesny, I Law in the Middle East, 212-218 (1955). Consult Newman on Trusts,
4-9 (2nd Ed. 1955) for the trust concept in other legal systems.
6 Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 130 (1894).
7 Digby, History of Law of Real Property, 320 (1950). The words "use" and "trust"
are often employed as synonyms. However there was a distinction at common law.
A, trust which was active or special, that is, one where the trustee had duties to per-
form was properly called a "trust." When the trust was passive and the trustee had
no duties to perform, it was called a "use." Also see Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use,
10 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (1935).
8 See I Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, 13 (1951).
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There could be no remedy at law unless a writ could be found to fit your
case and no such writ existed for the beneficiary of a trust or use. Thus,
the trustee of the property could do with it as he wished and the bene-
ficiary was helpless to stop him.9 However, with the development of the
Court of Chancery, the uses and trusts became enforceable, since in
Chancery, equity and fairness ruled and not technicality. 10
In 1535, the Statute of Uses'1 was passed, the object of which was to
convert the equitable interest of the cestui que use into a legal interest.
This was passed to prevent the loss of feudal rights by the landlords; ob-
viate fraud on creditors, alienees, doweresses and tenants by the curtesy;
and injure the religious orders which were the beneficiaries of uses.' 2 The
statute expressly did not apply to personal property and was held, upon
interpretataion, to apply only to passive trusts or uses, thus leaving Chanc-
ery free to enforce active trusts. 8 All these interests which were unaffect-
ed by the Statue of Uses, and which were recognized and enforced by
Chancery, became more commonly known as "trusts" and form the basis
of our modern system of that subject.' 4
11. DEFINITION
The difficulty with defining a trust'5 has led many authors to list its
characteristics rather than to attempt a definition. The following charac-
teristics are to be noticed: (1) a trust is a relationship; (2) it is a relation-
ship of a fiduciary character; (3) it is a relationship with respect to prop-
erty, not one involving merely personal duties; (4) it involves the existence
9 Ames, Lectures on Legal History 236, 237 (1893). Holdsworth IV History of
English Law 407 (1922).
10 Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts, 2 Select Essays in Aug. 6-American Legal His-
tory, 741, 742 (1893).
1127 Henry VIII (1535), C. 10.
12 Jenks, Short History of English Law 99 (1949). Also see Holdsworth, Causes
Which Shaped The Statute of Uses, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 121 (1912).
13 In Tyrrels' Case, Dyer 155 (1557), the statute was held not to apply to a use on
a use. For a discussion of the effect of the Statute of Uses, see I Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 5 (1951).
14 See 17 Mich. L. Rev. 87 (1918) for a discussion of the reasons for the survival of
the trust.
15 The Restatement of Trusts adopts the definition that it is "a fiduciary relation-
ship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the property is held
to equitable duties to deal withthe property for the benefit of another person, which
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." Rest., Trusts S 2 (1935).
Bogert defines a trust as a "fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a
property interest for the benefit of another, Bogert, I Trusts and Trustees S 1 (1951).
Walter G. Hart, after considering and criticizing all the important definitions since
1734, defines a trust as "an obligation imposed, either expressly or by implication of
law, whereby the obligor is bound to deal with the property over which he has con-
trol for the benefit of certain persons, of whom he may himself be one, and any one
of whom may enforce the obligation." What Is a Trust? 15 L. Quart. Rev. 301 (1899).
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of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to
deal with it for the benefit of another; and (5) it arises as a result of a
manifestation of intention to create the relationship. The combination of
these things characterizes the notion of the trust as that notion has been
developed in the Anglo-American law.
III. CLASSIFICATION
Trusts, in respect to the ways in which they arise, are divided into (1)
express trusts, (2) resulting trusts, and (3) constructive trusts.16 Express
trusts come into being because the parties concerned have formed the
actual intent that they shall arise and have expressed that intent in written
or spoken words or otherwise and have made the requisite property trans-
fers. Resulting trusts occur where the courts presume or infer from cer-
tain acts that the parties intended a trust to exist, although the parties ex-
pressed no such trust intent directly and may not actually have it. Con-
structive trusts are imposed by chancery on the holders of legal or equita-
ble titles as means of accomplishing justice and preventing unjust enrich-
ment. The scope of this discussion shall be hereafter limited to the express
trust.
IV. CREATION
The principal methods of creating an express trust are generally treated
according to the following enumeration: (1) a declaration by the owner
of property that he holds it as trustee for another person; (2) a transfer
inter vivos by the owner of property to another person as trustee for the
transferor or for a third person; (3) a transfer by will by the owner of
property to another person as trustee for a third person; (4) an appoint-
ment by one person having a power of appointment to another person as
trustee for the donee of the power or for a third person; (5) a promise
by one person to another person whose rights thereunder are to be held
in trust for a third person.17 These methods of creation shall become im-
portant in a subsequent discussion of the validity of the legal results of
the Matter of Totten.
16This classification is ado ted in the Restatement of Trusts in Section 2 (1935).
I Scott on Trusts § 2.1 (2nd e ., 1956), also adopts the classification. Cf. Bogert 1 Trusts
and Trustees 7 (1951). Bogert classifies trusts into two main groups, express trusts and
implied trusts with two subdivisions under each main heading. Private and charitable
trusts are under the heading of express trusts while resulting and constructive trusts
are subheads under implied trusts. Some authors have classified trusts into four groups,
namely, express, implied, resulting and constructive. They feel that an implied trust
exists because the parties used certain language which does not clearly create a trust,
but is construed by the courts to have that intent. Lewin, Trusts, 16, 82 (14th ed., 1888);
Perry on Trusts S 112 (7th ed., 1889).
17 See Rest., Trusts § 17, (1935); 1 Scott on Trusts § 17-17.5 (2nd ed., 1956); 1 Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees, S 41-80 (1951).
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V. ELEMENTS
The authorities agree that there must be four distinct elements in every
private express trust. They have been enumerated as follows: (1) there
must be an intent to create a trust; (2) there must be a trustee; (3) there
must be a res; (4) there must be a cestui que trust. These are determined
by asking four questions: (1) Is a trust intended? (2) Who is trustee?
(3) Of what is he trustee? (4) For whom is he trustee? 8
VI. REVOCATION OF A TRUST
It is important to note in the discussion of the Totten Trust that the
ordinary trust is irrevocable by the settlor, unless he demonstrates his
desire for a power of revocation. This reservation of a right of revocation
does not invalidate a trust 19 since the exercise of the right to revoke
operates as a condition subsequent.20 Further, it has been said that "unless
it can be gathered from the language used by the settlor or from the cir-
cumstances that he intended to reserve a power to revoke the trust, the
trust is irrevocable.' ' 21
VII. TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
A trust may often involve the post-mortem distribution of property
and, as such, is commonly known as an inter vivos trust.22 In effect, it is
a disposition of property generally accomplished by a will.23 By definition,
a will is "the expression, in the manner required by law, and operative for
no purpose until death." 24 It would seem that an inter vivos trust falls
under this definition and, therefore, to avoid fraud, should comply with
the formalities required by the Statute of Wills. 25 The law here makes a
18 The settlor of a trust is the person who intentionally causes the trust to come
into existence. The trustee is the person who holds the title for the benefit of another.
The trust property is the property interest which the trust holds, subject to the rights
of another. The beneficiary is the person for whose benefit the trust property is held
or used by the trustee. See 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 1 (1951).
19 Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225, 229 (1879).
20 The recognition of the validity of rights of revocation in trusts presents no diffi-
culty when one considers that rights of re-entry for condition broken and rights for
revocation in obsolete deeds are now recognized in England and the United States.
Tiffany, Real Property, S 681 (3rd ed., 1939).
21 3 Scott on Trusts 2393 (2nd ed., 1956).
22 See 1 Scott on Trusts S 56 (2nd ed., 1956).
23 The trust does have two of the three important qualities of a will: It can be rev-
ocable and it has the "hereditative" quality, i.e., it appoints someone to represent the
settlor after his death to carry out his intentions. The trust lacks the ambulatory quality
of a will. II Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 315 (2nd ed., 1903).
24 Gardner, Wills 1 (2nd ed., 1916).
25 "The legislatures have presumably balanced the hardship to the intended benefici-
aries which occurs where there is an intention to create a trust, against the hardship
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distinction. If the transferor succeeded in divesting himself in praesenti of
the interest he wished to transfer, the Statute of Wills is in no way in-
volved. But, if he retained an interest which upon his death was to go to
another, his effort was testamentary and the statute must be complied with.
Therefore, there must be found a valid transfer inter vivos in order to
uphold the trust. It is here that the problem arises, since, in each case,
the court must decide whether or not the combined effect of all the
powers, rights, control and dominion reserved by the settlor is such as to
leave him virtually the owner of the property and the trustee his mere
agent. It must decide what extent of control is sufficient in the settlor
to nullify the purported technical vesting of legal title in the trustee. It
must also draw the line between a valid inter vivos trust and an attempted
testamentary disposition.26 A later discussion of the Totten Trust indicates
that this line is not clearly drawn.27
THE MATTER OF TOTTEN
I. FACTUAL SITUATION
The factual situation which has created the problems of the Totten
Trust now confronting the courts arises when a person makes a deposit
in a savings bank or in the savings department of a bank or trust company
in his own name "in trust" for another. The depositor simply designates
himself on the deposit card as trustee for the named beneficiary. Some-
what analogous situations arise when the deposit is made in some other
form, but with the intention of giving an interest in the deposit to another.
These situations arise when the deposit is made in the name of the deposi-
tor and he subsequently makes an assignment of it to another,28 when the
which would result from making false claims; and in order to prevent the making of
false claims they have required that the disposition should be evidenced in a certain
formal manner." 1 Scott on Trusts § 55.9, 420 (2nd ed., 1956).
20 The instruments, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bromley v. Mitchell, 155
Mass. 509, 30 N.E. 83 (1892), have a "testamentary look" and the line must be drawn
somewhere.
27 Because the Totten or tentative trust circumvents the Statute of Wills, dispensing
with the necessitT for probate or administration, it has often been referred to as the
"poor man's will.'Newman on Trusts 77 (2nd ed., 1955).
28 This is a question of the gift of a choses in action which will be incomplete unless
the donor delivers the savings bank book to the donee or delivers a deed of gift. If the
gift is imperfect the courts generally do not declare a trust, Eschen v. Steers, 10 F.
2d 739 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); Knickerberg v. Hoff, 201 Ark. 63, 143 S.W. 2d 560 (1940);
Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (1908); Trubey v. Pease, 240 111. 512, 88
N.E. 1005 (1909); First and Tri-State National Bank & Trust Co. v. Caywood, 95 Ind.
App. 591, 176 N.E. 871 (1933); Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 284 N.W. 91, 293 N.W. 841
(1929, 1940); Frazier v. Hudson, 279 Ky. 334, 130 S.W. 2d 809 (1939); Rock v. Rock,
309 Mass. 44, 33 N.E. 2d 1973 (1941); Detroit Bank v. Bradfield, 324 Mich. 124, 36 N.W.
873 (1949); State ex rel. Union National Bank of Springfield v. Blair, 350 Mo. 622, 166
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deposit is made in the name of another, 29 and when the deposit is made in
the name of the depositor and another jointly.30
1I. THE PROBLEM
The problem then arises whether the depositor has created a trust, and,
if so, the kind of trust. The answer to this problem will be solved by a
scrutinization of the settlor's intention in setting up the trust. This ques-
tion has been previously referred to in this discussion as the first element
to be considered in the examination of a trust in the determination of its
validity.3 ' The possible intentions of the depositor when he makes the de-
posit "in trust" for another may be (1) to create an irrevocable trust; (2)
not to create a trust; (3) to create a revocable trust. 32 The courts must
determine this intention by examining the evidence of it or by conjectur-
ing in the absence of it. The remainder of the discussion shall be devoted
to an analysis of these possible intentions as presented by the facts of each
case.
1II. THE HISTORY IN NEW YORK
The history of the New York decisions must first be studied if one is to
acquire an intelligent grasp of the situation since it is here that the court
decided The Matter of Totten. The early cases doubted that a deposit in
a savings bank "in trust" for another created a trust if there was no evi-
dence of an intention to create a trust other than the mere form of the
deposit. There was even conjecture whether a trust resulted without a de-
livery of the bank book to the cestui que trust. However, it was held in
Martin v. Funk33 that the depositor's retention of the bank book was not
inconsistent with the creation of a trust since it was only natural to expect
S.W. 1085 (1942); Matter of Solot, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (1944); Hagerott v. Davis, 73
N.D. 532, 17 N.W. 26 (1944); Ratcliff v. Lee, 200 Okla. 253, 192 P. 2d 843 (1948); Alls-
house's Estate, 304 Pa. 481, 156 Ad. 69 (1931); Taylor v. Staples, 8 R.I. 170, 5 Am. Rep.
556 (1865); Mathews v. Drew, 106 Vt. 245, 172 Atl. 638 (1934).
29This is neither a trust nor an assignment of a chose in action. It is consideration
paid to the bank for its promise to pay the amount of the deposit to another party.
I Scott, § 58.6 (2nd ed., 1956).
30This is generally not the creation of a trust but the payment of consideration to
the bank for its promise made to the depositor and the other party. Although no ques-
tion of the law of trusts is involved, the courts sometimes speak in the terminology of
trusts. But it should be noted that there may be the intent to create a trust for a third
person. Jarkieh v. Badagliacco, 75 Cal. App. 2d 505, 170 P. 2d 994 (1946).
31 The other elements for the creation of a trust are obviously present. The de-
positor's claim against the bank is specific trust property. He has communicated his
declaration to a third party. The beneficiary is definite and identified.
32 See Rest. Trusts, S 58, comment a (1935) which adopts the language of the Totten
case.
8375 N.Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446 (1878).
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a trustee to retain it. The court further stated that communication to the
beneficiary is unnecessary to the creation of a trust. It should be observed
that the court concerned itself with the questions of the creation of a trust
and whether it was irrevocable. The case is only authority for the con-
clusion that a trust of a savings bank deposit can be created without de-
livery of the bank book to the beneficiary and without communication to
him of the intention to create a trust if there was evidence of the deposi-
tor's intention to create a trust other than the mere form of the deposit.
The Court of Appeals of New York eleven years later in Beaver v.
Beaver34 held that, when the deposit was in fact made in the name of an-
other and not in the name of the depositor as trustee for another, that even
if the deposit had been made in the name of the depositor in trust for the
other that the mere form of the deposit alone was insufficient to raise an
inference that the depositor intended to create a trust. The court still as-
sumed that it was either a question of no trust or an irrevocable trust.
Then, fifteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals decided the
case of Matter of Totten.35 The court there held that, in the absence of
evidence that an irrevocable trust was intended or that no trust at all was
intended, there arose an inference from the mere form of the deposit that
the depositor intended to create a revocable trust. Thus, the court recog-
nized that there are not merely two possible alternatives, but that there is
a third-a revocable trust.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
TOTTEN TRUST AT THE STATE LEVEL
The situation of a deposit in the bank by the depositor in trust for an-
other in the absence of other evidence as to the intention of the depositor
has resulted in a division of courts as to the formation of a trust.a0 A num-
34 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889); 137 N.Y. 59, 32 N.E. 998 (1893).
35 "After much reflection upon the subject, guided by the principles established by
our former decisions, we announce the following as our conclusion: A deposit by one
person of his own money in his own name as trustee for another standing alone, does
not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative
trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his life-
time by some unequivocal act on declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice
to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary in that revocation,
or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an abso-
lute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." 179 N.Y.
112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752.
36There is even a division of authorities on the conclusion to be drawn from the
cases. "In most states.., the inference is that the depositor intended to create a trust
but to reserve power to revoke it at any time," Scott, § 58.1, 478 (2nd ed., 1955). "The
tendency is to hold that the depositor impliedly intends to reserve a power of revoca-
tion by act inter vivos or by will," Bogert, 1 Trusts and Trustees, § 47, 327 (1951).
"When funds are deposited in the name of the depositor in trust for another person,
COMMENTS
ber of courts, following the decision of the Totten case, have held that
there is an inference that the depositor intended to create a revocable
trust.8 7 There is also some authority for the proposition that there is an
inference of the creation of an irrevocable trust.-s Furthermore, some few
cases hold that there is an inference that the depositor did not intend to
create any kind of a trust.8 9
A problem again results when there is evidence to be considered by the
court. The evidence will be important when it conflicts with the prevail-
ing tendency of the state. The states which follow the theory of the Tot-
ten case and presume a revocable trust from the mere bank account in
trust for another will be confronted by a conflict when the evidence shows
that the depositor either intended no trust or an irrevocable trust. In con-
trast, those states which hold that there is an irrevocable trust, will be pre-
sented with a conflict when there is evidence of either no trust or a rev-
ocable trust. Lastly, those states that hold there is no trust must find evi-
there arises, according to the law of a few states, a trust which, being revocable, is
merely tentative." Newman on Trusts, 76 (1955).
"The weight of authority, however, appears to be in support of the doctrine that the
mere fact ofsuch a deposit, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during
the lifetime of the depositor, but a tentative trust merely, which is revocable at the will
of the depositor until he dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal
act or declaration showing that the creation of a trust was intended." 7 Am. Jur. 438.
37 In the absence of evidence of a different intention of the depositor, the new fact
that a deposit is made in a savings bank is the name of the depositor "as trustee for
another person is sufficient to show an intention to create a revocable trust" Rest.,
Trusts, S 58, Comment a (1935). "... we hold that neither the retention of the passbook,
the absence of notice to the beneficiary, nor the withdrawals from and additions to
the deposit had the effect of disproving an intention on the part of the depositor to
create a trust; and we further hold, in harmony with the overwhelming weight of au-
thority, that the deposit here involved is presumptively a tentative trust, and in the
absence of evidence to rebut this presumption the beneficiary is entitled to the fund."
Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E. 2d 199, 202-203 (1939). See also Walso v. Lat-
terner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918), 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711 (1919);
Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (1905) aff'd 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 Ad. 1135
(1907); Fiocchi v. Smith, 97 At. 283 (N.J.Ch., 1916). Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
71 N.E. 748 (1904). "This conclusion is in accord with the doctrine of tentative trusts
which has been developed in New York, where litigation of trust bank accounts has
been much greater than with us." Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 Ad. 106, 108 (1933),
noted in 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 413; Banca D'Italia and Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super.
452, 36 A. 2d 242 (1944); Krewson Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A. 2d 250 (1944).
38 "The rule of the Totten Case does not appeal to us with favor." Cazallis v. Ingra-
ham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359, 363 (1920); Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315
(1935).
39 "In order to make oneself trustee for another of property held by the settlor,
everythng mus be done to end the absolute dominion of the settlor." Mulloy v.
Charetown Fiv Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 188 N.E. 608, 610 (1934); Hogarth-
Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E. 2d 446 (1926). See Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y.
421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889), 137 N.Y. 59, 32 N.E. 998 (1893).
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dence of an irrevocable trust. This distinction is important and must be
remembered in the analysis of evidence which is to follow.
Evidence which indicates no trust was intended shows that the deposit
was made in his own name as trustee for another merely for a private and
different purpose of the depositor. A depositor's statements at the time
of the deposit that he intended no trust is receivable as part of the res
gestae and carries great weight. 40 The supposed beneficiary's statements
that no trust was intended, made with knowledge of the deposit,41 or that
the deposit was made for the purpose of receiving higher interest rates
and not as a trust 42 is receivable as strong evidence that the depositor
intended no trust. The depositor's act of obliterating the words of trust
from the bank book indicates that he had no intention of creating a trust.I
A deposit subsequent to the death of the named beneficiary indicates no
trust but a mere form of convenience of the depositor. 44 The fact that
the depositor has used the interest accruing upon the deposit for his per-
sonal benefiit has some tendency to show that the depositor intended no
trust, and considered along with other facts has led to a decision that
there was no trust.45 The use by the depositor of the account as his only
active account for the transaction of his business is strong evidence against
a trust.46 Failure to indicate the trust intent by notice, delivery of the
book, or in some other manner, is strong evidence that no trust was in-
tended if this occurs before the death of the named benefiiciary. 47 Further,
40 Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. 994 (1904); Connecticut River Savings
Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Atl. 487 (1893); Malley's Estate v. Malley, 69 R.I.
407, 34 A. 2d 761 (1943). But the testimony is inadmissible if the depositor is dead.
Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N.Y. 433, 88 N.E. 750 (1909); Matter of Bunt, 96 Misc. 114,
160 N.Y. Supp. 111 (1916); In re Peaman's Estate, 163 N.Y. Supp. 800 (1917); Merigan
v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 AtI. 994 (1903); Ray v. Simmons, 11 R.I. 266, 23 Am. Rep.
447 (1875); Connecticut River Say. Bank v. Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Ad. 487
(1893); Bradford v. Enton Say. Bank of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 127, 46 A. 2d 284
(1946); In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (1944).
41 Barefield v. Rosell, 177 N.Y. 387, 69 N.E. 732 (1904); Devlin v. Hinman, 34 App.
Div. 107, 54 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1898); Moschetti v. De Cubellis, 66 R.I. 463, 20 A. 2d 253
(1941).
42 Matter of Mueller, 15 App. Div. 67, 44 N.Y. Supp. 280 (1897).
48 In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1905).
44Ibid.
4 5Mary v. Williams, 83 Hun. 243, 31 N.Y. Supp. 620; aff'd 744 N.Y. 701, 39 N.E. 858
(1895); Garvey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906); Thomas v.
Newburgh Sav. Bank, 73 Misc. 308, 130 N.Y. Supp. 810; aff'd 147 App. Div. 937, 132
N.Y. Supp. 1148 (1911).
4 6 Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Ad. 807 (1908).
47 Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N.Y. 43, 41 N.E. 412 (1895); Haux v. Dry Dock
Sav. Inst., 2 App. Div. 165, 37 N.Y. Supp. 917; aff'd 154 N.Y. 736, 49 N.E. 1097 (1896);
In re Bulwinlde, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1905); Garvey v. Clifford, 114
App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906); Matter of United States Trust Co. of New
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the depositor's allowance of the account to stand as a trust account after
the death of the supposed beneficiary 48 or an addition to the account after
his death49 does not show a complete trust. It may also appear from the
evidence that the deposit was made in order to evade a statute or by law
of the bank limiting the amount of the deposits permitted to individual
depositors, or to conceal the true ownership of the deposit.Y°
The evidence may also show that the depositor intended to create an
irrevocable trust. A statement by the depositor to a third person of his
intention to make the trust irrevocable constitutes strong evidence of irrev-
ocability.5 ' A notification by depositor to the beneficiary that the de-
posit has been made in trust form shows a strong indication of an irrev-
ocable trust 52 but this may be rebutted by other facts in the case. 53 A de-
York, 117 App Div. 178, 102 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1907); In re Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74,
111 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1908); In re Smith's Estate, 40 Misc. 331, 81 N.Y. Supp. 1035 (1903);
In re Thompson's Estate, 85 Misc. 291, 147 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1914); Rambo v. Pile, 220
Pa. 235, 69 At. 807 (1908). Contra: Bishop v. Seamen's Bank for Savings, 33 App. Div.
181, 53 N.Y. Supp. 488 (1898). And see In re Kive's Estate, 139 Misc. 273, 248 N.Y. Supp.
677 (1931); In re Vaughan's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1932).
4s Garvey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. 193, 99 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1906). Rambo v. Pile,
220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. 807 (1908).
49 In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y. Supp. 186 (1905).
50 Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P. 2d 565 (1945); Foschia v. Foschia,
158 Md. 69, 148 Ad. 121 (1930); Brabook v. Boston Five Cents Saving Bank, 104 Mass.
228, 6 Am. Rep. 222 (1870); Parkham v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 24 N.E. 43
(1890), Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182 Mass. 110, 65 N.E. 27 (1902); Robert-
son v. Parker, 287 Mass. 351, 191 N.E. 645 (1934); Frank v. Heimann, 302 Mo. 334,
258 S.W. 1000 (1924); Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Ad. 807 (1908); Peoples Savings
Bank v. Webb, 21 R.I. 218, 42 Atl. 874 (1899); Malley v. Malley, 69 R.I. 407, 34 A. 2d
761 (1943). See also Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, 132 Conn. 92, 42 A. 2d 662
(1945); Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 At. 994 (1904). Compare Schauberger
v. Tafel, 202 Ky. 9, 258 S.W. 953 (1924).
5' Miller v. Clark, 40 Fed. 15 (C.C.D. Conn., 1889), appeal dismissed 138 U.S. 223
(1891); Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466, 10 So. 546 (1891); Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512,
16 Am. Rep. 69 (1873); Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 At. 43 (1899); Mucha v.
Jackson, 119 N.J. Eq. 348, 182 Ad. 827 (1936); Eagles Building & Loan Association v.
Fiducia, 135 N.J. Eq. 7, 37 A. 2d 116 (1944), aff'd mem. 136 N.J. Eq. 117, 40 A. 2d 627
(1945); Provident Institution for Savings v. Bolton, 140 N.J. Eq. 1, 52 A. 2d 833 (1947).
52 Kuck v. Raftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P. 2d 552 (1931), noted in 4 Detroit L.J. 93;
Genish v. New Bradford Institution, 128 Mass. 159, 35 Am. Rep. 365 (1880); Alger v.
North Ed Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N.E. 916 (1888); Scrivens v. North Easton
Savings Bank, 166 Mass. 255, 44 N.E. 251 (1896); McCaffrey v. North Adams Savings
Bank, 244 Mass. 396, 138 N.E. 393 (1923); Burteau v. Lavalle, 284 Mass. 276, 187 N.E.
628 (1933); Matter of Pierce, 132 App. Div. 465, 116 N.Y. Supp. 816 (1909); Matter of
Cohen, 90 N.Y. Supp. 2d 776 (1949); McGary Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 40 A. 2d 350 (1946);
Atkinson, Petitioner, 16 R.I. 413, 16 Ad. 712 (1889); Slepkow v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 210,
172 Ad. 328 (1934). See Matter of Gron, 62 N.Y. Supp. 2d 392 (1936). Cf. O'Hara v.
O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N.E. 909 (1925).
58 Peterman's Estate 56 D. & C. 365 (Pa., 1946); Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A. 2d
881 (1952), noted in 26 Temple L. Q. 468 (1953), 14 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 627 (1953).
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livery of the bank book by the depositor to the beneficiary also indicates
an intention of an irrevocable trust54 but it may be shown that the delivery
was to the beneficiary for safekeeping purposes only.55
V. CONFLICT WITH THE STATUTE OF WILLS
The previous discussion of the effect of the Statute of Wills as an at-
tempted trust which passed no present interest indicated that this at-
tempted trust failed because it did not comply with the wills act. This
law becomes important when a deposit is made in trust for another and
the court has declared that there exists a power of revocation in the de-
positor. There is no problem if the court has held that there is no trust
created by the deposit since the disposition fails on trust principles and
not on those of wills. On the other hand, if there is an inference or evi-
dence of the creation of an irrevocable trust, there is again no question as
to the effect of the Statute of Wills since the disposition is not testamen-
54 Emanuelson v. Delle, 8 Conn. Supp. 180 (1940); Scanzo v. Morano, 284 Mass. 188,
187 N.E. 552 (1933); Harrington v. Donlin, 312 Mass. 577, 45 N.E. 2d 953 (1942); Long
Branch Banking Co. v. Winter, 112 N.J. Eq. 218, 163 Ati. 903 (1933); Trust Company
of New Jersey v. Farawell, 127 N.J. Eq. 45, 11 A. 2d 98 (1940); Hickey v. Kahl, 129
N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A. 2d 33 (1941); Davlin v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 229 App.
Div. 269, 241 N.Y. Supp. 712 (1930), aff'd 255 N.Y. 559, 175 N.E. 312 (1930), Hanigan
v. Wright, 233 App. Div. 82, 251 N.Y. Supp. 651 (1931), aff'd 257 N.Y. 602, 178 N.E.
813 (1931); Matter of Farrell, 298 N.Y. 129, 81 N.E. 2d 51 (1948). Noted in 17 Fordham
L. Rev. 295 (1948), 37 Georgetown L.J. 281 (1948), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 727 (1949), 35
Va. L. Rev. 272. Imperatrice v. Imperatrice, 77 N.Y. Supp. 2d 437 (1947), aff'd mem.
298 N.Y. 549, 81 N.E. 2d 95 (1948); Matter of La Brasche, 301 N.Y. 718, 790, 95 N.E.
2d 404 (1950), aff'g Application of Siverson, 276 App. Div. 1025, 95 N.Y. Supp. 2d 591
(1950); Tibbitts v. Zink, 231 App. Div. 339, 247 N.Y. Supp. 300 (1931); Larkin v.
Greenwich Savings Bank, 241 App. Div. 874, 271 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1934); Matter of
Rosso, 146 Misc. 746, 262 N.Y. Supp. 861 (1933). Matter of Smith, 177 Misc. 601, 31
N.Y.S. 2d 603 (1941); Knast Estate 66 D. & C. 383 (Pa., 1949); Gobeille v. Allison,
30 R.I. 525, 76 Atl. 354 (1901).
55 Greeley v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E. 2d 394 (1941), noted in 30 Georgetown L.J.
104 (1941); Johnson v. Savings Investment and Trust Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 466, 160 AtI. 371
(1932); Mathews v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 208 N.Y. 508, 102 N.E. 520 (1913); Matter
of Bowen, 156 Misc. 435, 282 N.Y. Supp. 290 (1935), aff'd without opinion, 247 App.
Div. 708, 774, 286 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (1936); Thomas Brevoort Savings Bank, 275 App.
Div. 724, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (1949); McKeever v. Empire Trust Co., 270 N.Y. Supp. 494
(1934); Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y. Supp. 869 (1934). Bearinger's
Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A. 2d 342 (1939). But the exclusive possession of the bank book
by the beneficiary, sole heir and next of kin does not show the existence of an irrev-
ocable trust. In re Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74, 111 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1908). Delivery of the
bank book to a third person also may indicate an irrevocable trust. Peck v. Scofield,
186 Mass. 108, 71 N.E. 109 (1904); Martin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. 445, 61 N.Y. Supp.
814, appeal dismissed 166 N.Y. 611, 59 N.E. 1126; Scallan v. Brooks, 54 App. Div. 248,
66 N.Y. Supp. 591 (1900), Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. 509, 75 N.Y. Supp. 1,
aff'd 66 N.E. 1115, 173 N.Y. 626 (1902). But other facts may also overcome this indi-
cation of irrevocability. Latten v. Van Ness, 107 App. Div. 393, 95 N.Y. Supp. 97, aff'd
77 N.E. 1190, 184 N.Y. 601 (1905).
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tary since the depositor has passed a present interest to the beneficiary.
But the problem does arise in the situation of the revocable trust since the
depositor has not only power to revoke and modify the trust so long as
he lives but also the power to act as he likes with respect to the trust
property.
As might be expected, the decisions of the courts which recognize a
bank account in trust for another as a revocable trust are split on the issue.
New York has decided the question in favor of the trust in a multitude of
decisions, and has awarded the deposit to the beneficiary at the death of
the settlor.56 Following the lead of New York, the decisions of ten other
jurisdictions have upheld the saving bank deposits as valid trusts not in
violation of the Statute of Wills.57
However, a few states have held that the fact that the depositor intends
to retain control over the deposit during his lifetime makes the disposition
testamentary, therefore violative of the Statute of Wills, with the result
that the beneficiary is not entitled to the deposit, even though the settlor
has not attempted to revoke the trust.58
The problem among the states is further complicated by statutes, which
have been passed by the majority of states, providing that whenever a de-
posit is made in a savings bank by one person in trust for another, with
56 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951), noted in 15 Albany L. Rev.
254 (1952). Matter of Ellis, 178 Misc. 491, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1942) aff'd mem. 264 App.
Div. 846, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 187 (1942); Mahnken v. Seybolt, 143 Misc. 874, 257 N.Y. Supp.
622 (1932); Estate of Timko, 150 Misc. 701, 270 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1934); Hoppev. Presi-
dent and Directors of Manhattan Co., 154 Misc. 745, 278 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1935); Matter
of McCann, 155 Misc. 763, 281 N.Y. Supp. 445 (1935); Matter of Denison, 157 Misc.
385, 284 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1935); Matter of Loeffler, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (1950); In re City
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1953).
57 Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P. 2d 565 (1945); Brucks v. Home Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P. 2d 545 (1951); Cressy v. Fisher, 16 Conn.
Supp. 391 (1949); Delaware Trust Company v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A. 2d
383 (1943), aff'd Creemlish v. Delaware Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 374, 38 A. 2d 463 (1944);
Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E. 2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231
S.W. 2d 2 (1950). Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church, 101 Md. 494,61 At. 635 (1905); Bollack
v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 Atl. 317 (1935); Greeley v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E. 2d
394 (1941). Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918), 143 Minn. 364, 173
N.W. 711 (1919); Dyste v. Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229
N.W. 865 (1930); Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272
N.W. 166 (1937); Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. 106 (1933); Pozzuto's Estate,
124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (1936); Krewsen Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A. 2d 250
(1944); Shapley Trust, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. 2d 277 (1946); Mace v. Fulton County Nat.
Bank, 79 D. & C. 325 (Pa., 1951); Ingels Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 92 A. 2d 881 (1952). See
In re Scott's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C., 1951).
5 8 Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Ad. 267 (1905), aff'd 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 Ad.
1135 (1907). It should be noted that subsequent statutory modifications in New Jersey
place it in general accord with the Totten Case. Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172
S.W. 2d 975 (1943), aff'g Baldwin v. Fleck, 168 S.W. 2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
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the bank receiving no further notice from the depositor, that the bank
may pay the deposit to the beneficiary on the death of the trustee. 59 The
interpretation placed upon these statutes by the courts have indicated that
the purpose of the statute is merely to protect the bank if it makes pay-
ment to the beneficiary.60
VI. THE POSITION OF ILLINOIS
There is no question but that the formula of the "Totten Trust" is pres-
ent in Illinois.61 A depositor in a bank or saving and loan association desig-
nates himself on the deposit card as trustee for a named beneficiary. The
depositor still retains complete control over the account so long as he lives
and may withdraw, deposit, or close out the account at will.62 Upon the
death of the depositor-trustee, the named beneficiary receives the funds
so deposited. In effect, this is a Totten Trust and yet, strangely enough,
that case has not been litigated at the appellate level in Illinois courts.6
Therefore, if the issue is placed squarely before the courts in Illinois, 64
they will find themselves confronted with three problems: (1) What is
59 The following states have such a statute: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
60 The Illinois decisions on the subject will be analyzed in detail in a later section of
this comment.
61 The following are some of the banks which issue deposit cards in the Totten Trust
form: (1) Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago. Form 4-C-63;
City National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago. Form NN-6; Harris Trust & Savings
Bank. Form B-373.
62 The typical form provides: "All deposits in this account are made for the benefit
of ... (name of beneficiary) ... (residence) . . .' (relationship) .. .(date of birth) ...
(birth place) to whom or to whose legal representative said deposits or any part thereof,
together with the interest thereof, may be paid in the event of death of the undersigned
trustee . . . [S] Trustee." See the various forms as listed in footnote 61, supra. It is inter-
esting to note that there is no express reservation of revocation by the depositor-trustee
in these forms.
63 In Helfrich's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944),
there was a savings accounts trust which the commissioner contended was "Totten"
or "tentative" and hence invalid or at best, revocable. The court, in a decision which
we shall consider, rejected the contention and found a valid irrevocable trust. The
Illinois Annotations of Rest. Trusts, S 58 (1941), reveals no cases directly on point in
Illinois. A check with some officers of Chicago banks revealed that there has been some
litigation involving the issue of the Totten Trust. This litigation, however, was minor
and inconsequential and hence is unreported. Also see 23 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 301 (1956).
64 This could most easily occur if a suit arises between the trust beneficiary and a
third person claiming an interest in the estate of the deceased depositor-trustee. There
are many other conceivable situations, i.e., Helfrich's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
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the intention of the depositor in making the deposit? 65 (2) Is the trust in-
vaiid as a testamentary disposition that does not comply with the Statute
of Wills?6 (3) What is the interpretation of the Illinois statutes which
provide that a bank will be protected if it pays the deposit to the benefici-
ary on the death of the trustee.0 7 These problems shall receive separate
treatment in the succeeding paragraphs.
As stated before,0 8 the intention of the depositor when he makes a de-
posit in his own name in trust for another may be: (1) to create an irrev-
ocable trust;09 (2) not to create a trust;70 (3) to create a revocable trust.71
In Illinois, as far back as 1892,72 it was said that "where the deposit is in
the name of a third person, and there is no delivery of the bank book, the
title to the fund does not pass to such person in the absence of any decla-
ration of trust73 or circumstances showing an intention to vest title. ' 74 In a
later case, 75 the court said, "It has been said in many cases, particularly
where the ownership of bank accounts has been in controversy that the
mere form of the account76 will not be regarded as sufficiently establish-
ing the intent of the person making it to create a trust in behalf of an-
other.' 77 These two statements raise the following questions: What is a
"declaration of trust"? What is the "mere form of the account"? The
court, in using the term "declaration of trust," could have intended that
a deposit "in trust" for another would meet this requirement and form a
trust. However, an analysis of the case shows that the court intended that
"declaration of trust" is to have the same meaning as was indicated in a
leading New York case on savings accounts trusts.78 In Beaver v. Beaver7 9
05 This problem is discussed nationally under Matter of Totten, Section IV of the
text supra.
66 This problem is discussed nationally under Matter of Totten, Section V of the text
supra.
67 See footnote 59 for states with similar statutes.
68 See Matter of Totten, Section II of the text supra.
69 Cazzallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 Atl. 359 (1920).
70 Mulloy v. Charlestown, Five Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 188 N.E. 608
(1934).
7' Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
72 Telford v. Patton, 144 I11. 611 (1892).
73 Italics added. 74 Telford v. Patton, 144 I11. 611, 625 (1892).
75 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Ill. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923). 76 Italics added.
77 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 I11. 473, 485, 138 N.E. 158, 163 (1923).
7 8 Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889). Telford v. Patton relies upon
and quotes directly from this case. Beaver v. Beaver, besides holding that no trust was
created by the mere form of the deposit, also held that either an irrevocable trust was
created or no trust was created. The case was subsequently overruled by Matter of
Totten which held a trust was created by the mere form of the deposit and that it was
revocable.
71. Ibid.
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the New York court indicated that, even if a deposit had been in the name
of the depositor in trust for another, the mere form of the deposit was
insufficient to raise an inference that the depositor intended to create a
trust. Thus, the language in the later Illinois decision 80 is completely in
conformity with the earlier case and Beaver v. Beaver."1 This interpreta-
tion of the "mere form of the account" and "declaration of trust" leads
to the theoretical conclusion that Illinois would find no trust created from
the Totten Trust formula alone.8 2
However, if the court did find a trust created from the mere form of
the account, 3 it would then be faced with the problem of whether, in the
absence of express language, it is a revocable or an irrevocable trust. It
would have to choose between the thought of Beaver v. Beaver,84 which
held that there is either an irrevocable trust created or no trust, and Matter
of Totten, which held there is a third choice, namely, the revocable trust.
Illinois has consistently held that when a trust has been perfectly cre-
80 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Ill. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923). This case relies on two earlier
New York cases which state the rule followed in Beaver v. Beaver, namely, Kelly v.
Beers, 194 N.Y. 49,86 N.E. 980 (1909), and In re Bolin, 136 N.Y. 177, 32 N.E. 626 (1892).
81 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889).
82 The term "theoretical conclusion" is used because the question is open to conjec-
ture on the following grounds: (1) The Illinois decisions which hold that no trust is
created from the mere form of the account relied on New York decisions which have
since been overruled by "Matter of Totten." Thus, it might be argued that since the
cases upon which the Illinois law stands have been overruled, the Illinois cases them-
selves are overruled; (2) In Helfrich's Estate et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944), a valid, irrevocable trust was created by a savings accounts
instrument. The court quotes from Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 356
I1. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934), as stating the requirements of a valid Illinois trust, "To
constitute a valid trust of personal property, there must be a declaration by a person
competent to create it, a trustee, designated beneficiaries, a certain ascertained object,
a definite fund or subject-matter, and its delivery or assignment to the trustee." The
case merely indicates the form of the deposit alone as the "declaration of trust" and
there is no further evidence of intent shown. If there was no evidence other than the
mere form of the account" no trust should be created under Illinois law. Yet, the ques-
tion was completely ignored in this case and a valid, irrevocable trust was created. The
court does, however, cite a Massachusetts case, Wasserman v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d
778 (1944) where there was other evidence besides the "mere form of the account"
and a trust was created. Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2069 (1948) follows
the reasoning and quotes from Helfrich's Estate as to the creation of a valid irrevocable
trust. There is no question raised as to "the mere form of the account" but the case
indicates more evidence of intention to support the declaration of trust on the deposit
instrument. Whether the issue was missed, ignored, or taken care of by other evidence
of intention in these two cases, is open to conjecture. Thus, there is the possibility in
Illinois that the "mere form of the account" may create a trust; (3) The courts may
interpret the Illinois statutes protecting a bank which pays the beneficiary on the death
of a depositor, as creating a Totten Trust. Ill. Rev. Stats. (1955) c. 16 , § 23 c. 32, S 770
(b); (4) The courts may just adopt the Restatement of Trusts § 58 (1935) viewpoint
which is a codification of the Totten Trust.
s8 This would only be one step in the recognition of the "Totten Trust."
84 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889).
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ated, it is not revocable at the will of the party who created it, unless he
has expressly reserved the power of revocation. 85 Whether Illinois would
make an exception in the cases of savings accounts trusts is hardly prob-
able. In connection with this problem, it would be well to consider two
decisions80 which cast some light upon the situation. Helfrich's Estate v.
Conmnissioner of Internal Revenue87 has the distinction of being the only
case which mentions the Totten Trust in connection with Illinois law. In
this case there were two trustees and several instruments, one of which
provided: "During the lifetime of the trustees and the survivor of them, all
moneys now and hereafter deposited in said accounts may be paid to or
upon the order of the trustees, or either of them, and upon the death of
the survivor of the trustees all moneys deposited in said account shall be
payable to or upon the order of the beneficiary. s88 The commissioner
contended that the trust was "Totten" or "tentative" and therefore in-
valid or at best revocable. 89 The court found a valid irrevocable trust and
not a "Totten" or "tentative" trust. It said: "The present case is dis-
tinguishable from the Totten cases on several grounds. Separate trust in-
struments were executed here and another trustee besides the settlor was
included. Neither practice is common to Totten trusts.. . . Furthermore,
the language of the instrument itself clearly negatives any right of with-
drawal or revocation in the settlor when it provides that "all moneys now
and hereafter deposited in said account may be paid to or upon the order
of the trustees .... No provision is made for the settlor to withdraw in his
own name." 90 In Albert v. Albert,91 there was an instrument purporting
to be a declaration of trust, 2 which provided: "During the lifetime of the
trustee all money now and hereafter deposited in said account shall be
paid to or upon the order of the trustee and, upon the death of the
trustee, all moneys deposited in said account shall be payable to or upon
the order of the beneficiary, or to his legal representative .... The trustee
85 Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 88 N.E. 1005 (1909); Light v. Scott, 88 Il. 239 (1878);
Fry v. Pence, 261 Ill. App. 218 (1931); Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Morse, 238
Ill. App. 232 (1925). This is in accord with the general rule of Trusts. See Historical
Background, section VI of the text, supra. The cases following Matter of Totten make
an exception in the cases of savings accounts. They "imply" a power of revocation.
86 Helfrich's Estate et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F. 2d 43 (1944);
Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2d 69 (1948).
87 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
88 Ibid., p. 43.
89 The commissioner seems to have felt that the Totten Trust would be invalid under
Illinois law but that there was a possibility of its being recognized. Thus, the wording
of his contention.
90 143 F. 2d 43 (1944).
91 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. 2d 69 (1948).
9 2 The problem as to whether this "declaration" alone was enough to create a trust
is discussed in footnote 82, supra.
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represents that there is existing no agreement in respect to said account,
except as herein set forth."93 There was, in fact, a separate instrument re-
serving the power of revocation. The court found a valid irrevocable trust.
Though the Helfrich case pays lip service to the Totten Trust and indi-
cates that it might possibly exist under Illinois law, it rather evasively
avoids that question and finds an irrevocable trust. The language of both
decisions in finding that irrevocable trusts were created by the savings
accounts instruments is a very strong indication that Illinois will not recog-
nize a revocable trust without an express reservation of revocation by the
depositor. Thus, it would seem that a "tentative" or Totten Trust could
not exist in Illinois under the theory of an "implied" reservation of a
power of revocation by the depositor-trustee.
But if Illinois were to recognize the doctrine of Totten trust, there
would arise the problem of "testamentary disposition. '94 As a general rule,
the creation of a trust is testamentary if no interest passes to the bene-
ficiary before the death of the settlor.95 As seen before,96 the whole prob-
lem centers around the powers, rights, control and dominion reserved by
the settlor. Are they such as to leave him virtually the owner of the prop-
erty and the trustee his mere agent.97 If these principles are applicable to
savings banks trusts, it is quite arguable that they are testamentary dis-
positions and that, since there is no compliance with the formalities re-
quired by the Statute of Wills, the beneficiary would not be entitled to
the deposit on the death of the depositor.98
Thus, it will be important to determine where Illinois draws the line be-
tween a valid inter vivos trust and an attempted testamentary disposition
in regard to the "control" of the settlor.99 The history of Illinois courts
in this respect indicates a definite liberal tendency in upholding trusts
93334 Ill. App. 440, 445, 80 N.E. 2d 69, 72 (1948).
94As explained before, no question of testamentary disposition will arise if the in-
tention of the depositor is shown to be to create an irrevocable trust or no trust at all.
See Matter of Totten, Section V of text supra.
95 See 1 Scott on Trusts, § 53 (2d Ed., 1956).
96 See Matter of Totten, Section V of text supra.
97 Some authorities feel that the problem of testamentary disposition is largely ignored
by the courts when consideritg savings accounts trusts. See 39 Dickinson L. Rev. 36
(1934); 1 Scott on Trusts, § 58.3 (2d Ed., 1956).
98The customary savings-accounts trust allows the depositor to retain complete con-
trol over the account as long as he lives. He may deposit, withdraw or close out the
account at will and he may change the beneficiary by making out a new deposit card.
See footnote 62 supra.
99 Farkas v. Williams, 5 I11. 2d 417, 25 N.E. 2d 600 (1955). The court, while admitting
that inter vivos trusts have a "testamentary look" and that the "line must be drawn
somewhere," did not feel the point had been reached in that case.
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where the settlor retains a large measure of control.100 The latest and lead-
ing case on this point is Farkas v. Williams.'"° There, Farkas as settlor and
trustee, reserved to himself as settlor the cash dividends of the stock for
his own personal account and use. He reserved the right as trustee to vote,
sell, redeem, exchange or otherwise deal with the stock. He also reserved
the right to revoke the trust or change the beneficiary. However, Farkas
did register the stock in the name of Farkas as trustee for the beneficiary.
This indicated that Farkas intended to assume those obligations set out in
the instrument as well as those fiduciary obligations implied by law. Also,
on the death of Farkas, the beneficiary would become the absolute owner
unless Farkas changed the beneficiary or revoked the trust, which was not
to be effective as to the company until written notice was delivered to it.
These are not the rights of an absolute owner for he can do with his prop
erty as he will without securing the approval of or notifying anyone and
without being held to the duties of a fiduciary while doing so. The court.
in balancing these factors and recognizing the liberal trend of Illinois said:
"It is obvious that a settlor with the power to revoke and to amend the
trust at any time is, for all practical purpose, in a position to exert con-
siderable control over the trustee regarding the administration of the trust.
For anything believed to be inimicable to his best interests can be
thwarted or prevented by simply revoking the trust or amending it in
such a way as to conform to his wishes."' 02 The court then lists some of
the powers a settlor might reserve which could render a trust testamen-
tary and states: "Actually any of the above powers could readily be as-
sumed by a settlor with the reserved power of revocation through the.
simple expedient of revoking the trust, and then, as absolute owner of the
subject matter, doing with the property as he chooses."' 1 3 Finally, the
court looked to the purpose of meeting the formalities required by the
Statute of Wills, namely, to prevent fraud. Here, there was clearly no
fraud since the stock was issued in compliance with the written declara-
tion of trust, in the name of Farkas as trustee for Williams. For these rea-
sons, the court found a valid inter vivos trust, and leave for consideration
the effect of this decision on the testamentary disposition problem of the
Totten Trust.10 4 The Farkas trust is similar to a savings deposit trust in
10OSee Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Bear v.
Milliken Trust Co., 336 11. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 I11.49, 54 N.E.
615 (1899).
1015 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955).
0 2Farkas v. Williams, 5 Il. 2d 417, 430, 125 N.E. 2d 600, 607 (1955).
103 Ibid.
104 Though some New York cases speak of the Totten Trust as arising upon the
death of the depositor, this comment shall proceed under the theory that the trust
arises at the time of the deposit. That is, that the trust is subject to a condition subse-
quent of revocation rather than a condition precedent of the depositor's death.
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many ways. The settlor in both instances, besides retaining a life interest,
can destroy the trust by revoking or consuming the corpus. Realistically,
the beneficiary's interest in either case amounts to a mere expectancy.
The formal documents executed in the Farkas trust are more elaborate
and extensive than those customarily used in a savings accounts trust but
theoretically they are the same. Therefore, by analogy, it would seem
that Illinois would follow the theory of the Totten case so far as the prob-
lem of testamentary disposition is concerned. From the language in the
Farkas case, it would seem that Illinois courts would desire to effectuate
the settlor's intent. They do not want to frustrate that intent with techni-
calities. Thus, as long as the courts can find any limitation on the settlor.
they will most probably reject the argument of testamentary disposition
and find a valid inter vivos trust.105 Thus, it would seem that if a Totten
Trust can be created in Illinois, it will not be held invalid as a testamen-
tary disposition.
The final problem to be considered by the Illinois courts in regard to
a Totten Trust is the interpretation of two statutes'0 6 which could con-
ceivably lead to recognition of the tentative trust. As far back as 1921, an
act in relation to the payment of deposits in trust was approved by the
Illinois legislature:
If a deposit is made with any corporation doing a banking or trust business
by one person in trust for another, the name and residence of the person for
whom it is made shall be disclosed, and it shall be credited to the depositor as
trustee for such person; and if no other notice of the existence and terms of a
trust has been given in writing to such corporation, the deposit, or any part
thereof, together with the interest thereon, nay, 0 in the event of the death
of the trustee, be paid to the person for whom said deposit was made, or to his
legal representative.' 0 8
While the wording of this statute could be reasonably interpreted as rec-
ognizing the tentative trust, there has not yet been any litigation in Illinois
concerning this theory. In 1955, another statute, 109 passed as part of the
Illinois Savings and Loan Act, goes a little further and provides:
If one or more persons opening or holding a withdrawal capital account shall
execute a written agreement with the association providing that the account
105 This limitation would probably come in the form of the deposit. By referring to
himself as "trustee," the depositor has bound himself in that fiduciary capacity. One
must also remember that small sums are involved which are easy to identify and there
is no great danger of fraud. Also the public policy behind the "poor man's will" has
to be considered, viz., the elimination of probate.
106 Ill. Rev. Stats. (1921) c. 161, § 23; (1955) c. 32, § 770 (b).
107 Italics added.
108 There has been no litigation at all on this statute since 1936. 111. Rev. Stat. (1921)
c. 161, § 23.
109 I11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, § 770 (b).
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shall be held in the name of such person or persons as trustees for one or more
persons designated as beneficiaries, the account and any balance thereof which
exists from time to time, shall be held as a trust account and unless otherwise
agreed between the trustees and the association: (1) Any such trustee during
his life time may change any of the designated beneficiaries by a written direc-
tion accepted by the association; and (2) Any such trustee may withdraw or
receive payment in cash or check payable to his personal order and any payment
or withdrawal shall constitute a revocation of the agreement as to the amount
withdrawn; and (3) Upon the death of the last surviving trustee the person or
persons designated as beneficiaries who are living at the death of the last sur-
viving trustee shall be the holders of the account (as joint owners with right of
survivorship if more than one) and any payment to the holder or any such
holders shall be a complete discharge of the association's obligation as to the
amount so paid.1l ° .
Some states have interpreted similar statutes as merely protecting a
bank if it makes payment to the beneficiary."' In states where a revocable
trust of the deposit is invalid as a testamentary disposition, it has been
held that the statute does not validate the disposition. 112 In states where
the Totten Trust is recognized it has been said that "the principle of law
laid down in Matter of Totten, was later made a part of the banking
law.""u 3 From an analysis of these cases, it would seem that the interpreta-
tion of such statutes protecting banks follows the policy of the particular
state in regard to a tentative trust. Thus, if a state recognizes the Totten
Trust, the banking statute adopts the Totten Trust principle. If a state
does not recognize the Totten Trust, they interpret the statute as being
there solely for the protection of the bank and that the rights of the de-
positor and of the beneficiary are not affected. No state has seen fit to
interpret this type of statute of itself as giving rise to a Totten Trust. Pro-
ceeding under this theory, it would seem that Illinois would not recognize
these statutes as an enactment of the Totten Trust unless such trust was
first judicially recognized in this state.
There is some indication that the legislature may have intended the
latter statute 1 4 to be an enactment of the Totten Trust. The 1921 act"15
states the bank "may" pay the beneficiary. The 1955 act" 6 states the ac-
count "shall" be held as a trust account and that the beneficiaries "shall"
be the holders of the account as joint "owners" and payment to the
"bolder" shall be a discharge. The use of the words "shall," "owners," and
110 Italics added.
" Alger v. North End Savings Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N.E. 916 (1888).
112 Jefferson Trust Co. v. Hoboken Trust Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 310, 152 Ad. 374 (1930).
113 In Hendersons Estate, 198 N.Y. Supp. 799, 800 (1923). See also Walso v. Lattemer,
140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918).
114 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 770 (b).
11 111. Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 161 § 23.
116 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 770(b).
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"holder" indicate that the intention of the legislature may have been to
enact the Totten Trust. Further evidence of this intention may be gath-
ered from the fact that this act repealed the Savings and Loan Act of
1919117 but did not repeal a portion enacted in 1939118 which specifically
was directed to limiting the liability of the association in paying the pro-
ceeds of trust accounts to fiduciaries and beneficiaries. A second section
whose sole object was to protect the associations from liability would be
redundant.
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that the Illinois courts can
either follow the standard interpretation of such statutes by other states
and thus find that the Totten Trust is not enacted by this statute or they
can engage in statutory construction to find that the Totten Trust is en-
acted by the statute.119
CONCLUSION
The theory behind trusts as evidenced throughout history 120 is in ap-
parent conflict with the theory behind the Totten Trust. The trustee has
always held the legal title for the cestui que trust who has always enjoyed
the benefits of the trust. The Totten Trust places the legal title and the
benefits in the trustee.12' Therefore, the Totten Trust is in conflict with
the definition of a trust.112 Technically, it cannot be classified as an express
trust, resulting trust or constructive trust. 23 Nor can it be said that it
arises by any of the principal methods of trust creation. 12 4 Further, the
117 See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 S 944.
118 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 S 953.
119 This latter interpretation hardly seems probable when one considers legislative
intent. The legislature would have come out in more positive terms employing the
language of S 58 of the Restatement of Trusts or of the Totten case had such been their
intent. It seems more probable that the real reason for the enactment of this statute
lies in the legislature's knowledge that the "tentative trust" does not exist in Illinois
and that the courts will so hold. In view of the thousands of savings accounts trusts
in Illinois in the form of tentative trusts, they wanted to provide definite and adequate
protection for the banks.
120 See Historical Background, Section I of text supra.
121 It could be argued that the beneficiaries' enjoyment is merely postponed. This is
not true, however, because the beneficiaries' interest in a Totten Trust is little than a
mere expectancy.
122 See Historical Background, Section II of text supra. There is no fiduciary rela-
tionship. There are no equitable duties on the trustee to deal with it for the benefit
of another. It is hard to see how it. arises as a manifestation of intention to create the
relationship.
123 See Historical Background, Section III of text supra. The only conceivable cate-
gory in which to place the Totten Trust is the express trust. Technically the Totten
Trust lacks the requisites of property transfer and express declaration of intention to
create a trust.
124 See Historical Background, Section IV of text supra.
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technical elements of a trust are not present.12 The Totten Trust also
violates the ordinary pr esumption against revocability in the law of
trusts. 126 Finally, it violates the Statute of Wills. 1 27 For these reasons, the
Totten Trust has been called a "serious anomaly" and a piece of "judicial
legislation.' 128
Thus, we are left to consider the total effect of this "fiction," this "poor
man's will," this "tentative" or "Totten" trust.129 Tht first important ob-
servation to be made is that the docrine is law in only a few states.'8 0
Many states have specifically rejected the doctrine. 13' Many states have
not as yet passed upon the doctrine.132 The total effect of the doctrine
when considering all states may be summarized in the word "confusion."
For example, confusion exists in the states which recognize the doctrine
because it is fiction. This is illustrated if a creditor of the beneficiary at-
tempts to attach the account,13 3 if the depositor disposes of the deposit by
125See Historical Background, Section V of text supra. Though it may be argued
that the depositor is the trustee, that the account is the trust res and that the bene-
ficiary is clearly named, it is hard to satisfy the requirement of intention.
126 See Historical Background, Section VI of text supra. Some authorities feel that
this "implied" power of revocation is not an extreme step. They feel that if the de-
positor intended a trust at all, it seems rather clear that he intended a revocable trust.
See C. W. Leaphart, 78 U. of P. L. Rev. 626 (1930).
127 See Historical Background, Section VII of text supra. Some authorities feel that
the courts tend to ignore this problem in savings accounts trusts. See 39 Dickinson
L. Rev. 36 (1934). One must also consider this issue in the light of the recent liberal
trend evidenced by such cases as Farkas v. Williams, 5 111. 2d, 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600
(1955).
128 Wilbur Larremore in 14 Yale L. J. 312 (1905). Most authorities choose to treat
the Totten Trust as a fiction. The application of the trust idea to bank deposits is
useful in arriving at a final solution of the problem. In other words everybody knows
that the trust deposit is not a trust, but they will treat it as if it were a trust. By this
method they may effectuate the intent of the depositor and realize the object of the
deposit. As has been said, the mind is baffled by conflicting forces and grasps at an
admittedly erroneous conception for the purpose of clarifying its reasoning and
effecting a desired objective." 39 Dickinson L. R. 37, 38 (1934).
129 These are some of the various terms employed by the authorities in describing
the savings accounts trust.
130 The doctrine is law only in California, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Pennsylvania, New York and Texas.
131 See footnotes 38, 39, supra.
182 These states are probably in the majority.
133 In Kelly General Finance Co., 16 D. & C 435 (Pa.) the court refused to permit
a creditor of the beneficiary of a trust account to attach the fund: "The case before
the court may be disposed of on the ground that, though the deposit is in form a trust
deposit, it is in fact not so, because the depositor has made withdrawals from time to
time from her funds, treating it as her own; or, if not withstanding her withdrawals
her deposit in the form made could be construed to be a declaration of trust in favor
of the beneficiary, she revokes it by her claim to it filed in this case." This case indi-
cates that the equitable and legal title are in the depositor and also shows the confused
thinking of the courts in trying to solve a problem of reality. It should also be noted
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a will,134 or if the beneficiary dies before the depositor. 135 This same con-
fusion arises among those courts which hold that the trust arises upon the
making of the deposit, 3 6 while others hold that it does not arise until the
death of the depositor. 37 The tentative trust theory has led to intermina-
blt litigation, as shown by the New York cases.'1 8 Further speculation
exists in states like Illinois'" which have not as yet passed upon the issue.
The existence of a savings account trust in this unpredictable situation
forces the legislature to pass statutes protecting banks,'1 40 places the de-
positor in a precarious position in regard to his account,14 ' and generally
jeopardizes the law of trusts. 42
Against this confusion one must weigh the advantages of the Totten
Trust:
1. An avoidance of inheritance taxes.
2. There are no formalities connected with its creation in contrast to a will.
3. The incompetency of the creator of a trust is not subject to as great an
attack as the incompetency of the testator of a will.
4. The trust does not incur the great expense and delay that is connected with
the administration of estates.
The advantages are ostensibly beneficial to a great number of depositors
and banks. But so long as social policy is held to be inferior to the settled
that a creditor of the depositor may attack the fund. In Re Reich's Estate 146 Misc. 616,
262 N.Y. Supp. 623 (1933).
134 See Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 Atl. 106 (1933). In Re Mannix Estate 147
Misc. 479, 264 N.Y. Supp. 24 (1933). In these cases the court held that a contrary will
revoked the tentative trust. It would seem that the "fiction" always yields to reality.
'35 Rambo v. Pyle, 220 Pa. 235, 69 At. 106 (1908). The executor of the cestui que
trust and the administrator of the trustee both claimed the fund. It was awarded to
the latter.
136 Coughlin v. Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166
(1937); Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 209 (1936). Under this theory the
trust is initiated at the time of the deposit subject to a condition subsequent of revo-
cation.
137 Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y. Supp. 869 (Surr. Ct., 1934); Matter
of Kelly, 151 Misc. 277, 271 N.Y. Supp. 457 (Surr. Ct., 1934). Under this theory the
beneficiaries' rights remain inchoate until the depositor's death. It has been suggested
that the Restatement of Trusts adopts this theory. See 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 852 (1939).
Under this theory it must be clearly seen that the deposit is testamentary since the
depositor's death is a condition precedent to the creation of the trust.
138 See cases cited 1 Scott on Trusts, 477-510 (1956).
139 See Matter of Totten, Section VI of text supra.
140 See footnote 59 supra.
141 For example the depositor may deposit his money thinking he has established
a revocable trust and have the courts decide it is irrevocable. The beneficiaries' creditors
may be able to reach the account. Various difficulties may be envisioned.
142 Unnecessary use of anomalous fictions such as the Totten Trust may prove in
the long run to be detrimental in that it opens the door for further erosions of some
of the settled doctrines upon which the stability trust law depends.
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principles of trust law the courts will continue to remain divided as to
acceptance of the Totten Trust theory.
TAXABILITY OF ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED FUNDS
Does illegally obtained money or property constitute taxable income to
the person so obtaining it? This area of the income tax law has been a
source of great discomfort to the federal courts and has been the subject
of considerable judicial divergence.
The initial consideration is, simply stated, whether or not illegally re-
ceived funds meet the requirements of "gross income," according to the
Internal Revenue Acts-as that term is interpreted by the federal courts.
The decisions further raise a question at times at to the motivation of the
government; that is, does the federal government seek to tax a given type
of receipt as a matter of policy, to punish those who participate in illegal
activities? This discussion, however, will center mainly on the question
first presented, that is, are illegal gains taxable?
EARLY DECISIONS (1919-27)
In a 1919 case, Rau v. United States,1 the defendant insurance agent em-
bezzled moneys which were delivered to him to be paid as insurance pre-
miums, and the court held that defendant had committed a larceny, and
therefore, the money so received was not subject to taxation under the
Revenue Act.2
In 1926, there were two cases in which the decision in the Rau case was
attacked. Steinberg v. United States3 held that profits from the sale of
liquor in violation of the law were taxable income. The court, in discussing
the applicable provision of the Internal Revenue Act,4 said that since the
phrase, "gains and profits from any source whatever," was used in the
statute, as contradistinguished from the term 'income," there was no
doubt that Congress meant to include all species of gain, no matter how
immoral or vicious the method of acquiring the same might be.
The case of United States v. Sullivan,5 in opposing the Rau case, presents
a concise and persuasive argument, by showing the trend in the history of
national income tax legislation. The court quoted from the first income
tax law to be passed under the Sixteenth Amendment of the federal Con-
situation, 6 where it was provided that the net income of a taxable person
1260 Fed. 131 (C.A. 2d, 1919).
2 Revenue Act referred to here was the Act of 1916.
3 14 F. 2d 564 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
4 Internal Revenue Act, 1921, at S a, 42 Stat. 238 (1921).
5 274 U.S. 259 (1927). 6 Internal Revenue Act, 1913, at S b, 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
